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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Nature of the case

This is a state income tax case. It is on review from the First Judicial
District, Kootenai County, case No. CV-15-3329. It was submitted on agreed facts
and briefs. The security deposit required by Idaho Code § 63-3049 has been paid.
The Idaho State Tax Commission assessed a tax deficiency based solely
against Linda Dunn's alleged community property interest in the wages of her
non-resident husband. The wages were earned and paid in the state of Texas.
The taxable years at issue are 2000, 2001, 2003, 2005 and 2007-2010. Her
husband, Barry Dunn, was employed by a Texas company. He died of cancer in
2012. No probate of his estate has been commenced. Vol. 1, p. 39. His estate is
not a party in this case.
Including one half of Barry Dunn's Texas wages into Linda Dunn's Idaho
income, is the sole issue in this case. R. p. 39. Linda Dunn, Appellant, claims
that her husband's wages are defined as the equivalent of separate property in
Texas and are not taxable to her for Idaho income tax purposes.
Texas has no state personal income tax. It is prohibited by the Texas State
Constitution, Vernon's Ann. Texas Const. Art. 8, § 24 (copy attached, A-1).
In Parker v. Idaho State Tax Commission, 148 Idaho 842, 230 P.3d 734
-1-

laws apply,

1

id. at 846. Linda Dunn urges that the community property law of Texas applies,

and under U.S. Supreme Court law decided in 2015, the Commerce Clause
prevents inclusion. Alternatively, since the unique Texas law treats wages of the
earner spouse as his separate property when the issue is a non-tortuous liability.
Barry Dunn's wages never entered Idaho in any way. The wages were his alone
and directly deposited in a Texas bank.

B.

Statement of facts

The facts, having been stipulated by the parties, are not in dispute. Barry
Dunn earned the wages outside ofidaho. R. p. 39, 40. Linda Dunn, his wife, was
an Idaho resident but her residency is not an issue in this case. R. p. 39. "Mr.
Dunn was domiciled in Texas during the years in question.

Petitioner was

domiciled in Idaho during the same period." R. p. 118. At no time was Barry
Dunn domiciled in Idaho. R. p. 39.

Barry Dunn earned the money while

personally present in Texas. The parties stipulated that Barry Dunn was not an
Idaho resident. R. p. 39. During all the years in question, he never worked in
Idaho. R. p. 40. Barry Dunn worked as a project manager for an off-shore drilling
company, Udelhoven, Inc. Udelhoven, Inc., Barry Dunn's only employer during
the relevant time, is a Houston, Texas, company and has no office or business in
-2-

was

a

driver's license and deposited his pay checks in the city of Tomball, Texas, bank
account. R. p. 40. During all the times involved, Barry Dunn never worked or
earned any of the wage income in Idaho. R. p. 39. Joint federal income tax
returns were filed by the Dunns during the relevant periods involved. During all
the years at issue, Barry Dunn lived in states other than Idaho.

He lived in

Washington in 2000, in either Washington or Alaska in 2001, Alaska in 2002, in
Alaska or Texas in 2003, and lived in Texas from 2004 until October 2010. Barry
Dunn was employed by Udelhoven, Inc., 4606 F.M. 1960 J.M. Road, Houston,
Texas. The company operated offshore drilling platforms. R. p. 39 Dunn worked
as a project manager. His employment required that he be personally present at
the site of the project. R. pp. 39-40. He always resided in the states where he
worked. R. pp. 39, 40. While in Texas, Barry Dunn's vehicle was licensed as a
Texas vehicle. He obtained a Texas Driver's License. He lived in Tomball, Texas
and his pay from Udelhoven, Inc. was deposited directly into his bank account in
Tomball, Texas. R., p. 39. Barry Dunn was personally present and earned the
income by his personal effort in Texas from 2004 through 2010, mostly on offshore drilling platforms. R., p. 40.
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II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

1.

Whether wages earned in Texas by a non resident spouse domiciled

in Texas is attributable as Idaho income to a non earning spouse domiciled in
Idaho.
2.

Whether the District Court erred in interpreting Texas law.

3.

Whether wages earned by a non-resident husband in Texas are

subject to the Idaho income tax of Linda Dunn, pursuant to Idaho Code § 633026A.
4.

Whether Texas law, Texas Family Code §§ 3.102(a)(l) and 3.202

(Vernon's Texas Statutes and Code annotated Title 1, Subtitle B, Subchapter C),
providing for management and control of earnings to the earner as if he or she
were single and specifically rejects joint control, are state of Idaho income to the
non earner spouse.
5.

Whether the Dormant Commerce Clause, Art. 1, § 8, cl 3 or other U.S.

Constitutional provisions, including the Privilege and Immunities Clause, Art. 4,
§ 2 prevent Idaho income taxation to a spouse of a non resident wage earner.

6.

Whether wages personally earned in Texas by a resident of Texas

while domiciled in Texas have a taxable nexus in Idaho? If so, is lack of nexus a
violation of due process and the Commerce Clause preventing Idaho income?
-4-

7,

1 4

944, 763 P.2d 1052 (1988), updated by Wynne, applies to prevent Idaho income
taxation.
8.

Does ComptrollerofTreasury of Maryland v. Wynne,_ U.S._, 135

S.Ct. 1787, 191 L.Ed.2d 813 (2015) apply to control the outcome of this case?
9.

Does actual receipt of income need be proved from husband earner

to wife?
10.

Whether the reciprocal credit statute in Idaho, Idaho Code§ 63-3029

is a violation of the U.S. Constitution, Art. 4, § 2, the Privileges and Immunities
provision, when the reciprocal state has no state income tax?
11.

Does the case of Lunding v. New York Tax Appeals Tribunal, 522 U.S.

287, 118 S.Ct. 766, 139 L.Ed.2d 717 (1998) applying the equal footing privileges
and immunities constitutional provision apply to this case?
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The case was tried on an agreed stipulation of facts before the Court. The
Court exercises free review of the case. Free review is exercised over the District
Court's application of relevant law to the facts. Also, constitutional issues are
pure questions of law over which this Court exercises free review. Icanovic v. State
159 Idaho 524, 528-9, 363 P.3d 365 (Idaho 2015); Crawford v. State, 160 Idaho
-5-

v.

I

44

P.3d 1100 (Idaho 2002); Post v. Idaho Fannway, Inc., 135 Idaho 475, 20 P.3d 11
(Idaho, 2001).
IV. ARGUMENT
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

Under the Commerce Clause, a state may not discriminate between
transactions on the basis of some interstate element, i.e. tax a transaction more
heavily when it crosses state lines (intrastate) than when it occurs in state
(interstate). It is illusory that Barry Dunn's Texas wages ever entered Idaho. The
record does not indicate that Linda Dunn ever received any of Barry Dunn's
wages. While there is no proof in the record, it is an equally creditable hypothesis
that the couple's Idaho sales and real estate taxes could have been paid from all
sources of their income and capital. Therefore, sales and real estate taxes pay for
Idaho governmental services provided to Linda Dunn. Barry Dunn would have
had no state tax to pay if his spouse was domiciled in Texas.

This is

discrimination. Wynne, 135 S.Ct. at 1801-2, requires that the tax structure of
every state tax non residents on a non discriminatory basis. Every state includes
the eight states that have no income tax, including Texas. Wynne, 135 S.Ct. at
1795 holds that the practical effect on taxpayers must be considered. Barry
-6-

wages are

reason

regardless of label (community or separate) they are not includeable into Linda
Dunn's Idaho state income.

A.

The Dormant Commerce Clause applies to this case.

"The Commerce Clause provides that Congress shall have
Power ... to regulate commerce ... among the several states." U.S.
Const. Art. 1, § 8, cl 3. The Supreme Court has interpreted this
affirmative grant of authority to Congress as also establishing what
has come to be called the Dormant Commerce Clause - a self
executing limitation on state authority to enact laws imposing
substantial burdens on interstate commerce even in the absence of
Congressional action."

United Egg Producers v. Department ofAgriculture of Commonwealth of Puerto Rico,
77 F.3d 567, 569-570 (1st Cir. 1996).

Parker v. Idaho State Tax Commission, 148 Idaho 842, 230 P.3d 734 (Idaho
2010) holds that the Dormant Commerce Clause did not apply "unless there is
actual or prospective competition between entities in an identifiable market and
state action that either expressly discriminates against or places an undue burden
on interstate commerce." Id. at 847. The Parker case held that "the commerce
clause is not implicated in this case." Ibid. 84 7. The Trial Court, on another issue,
noted that the primary issue of community property of Texas was not stipulated,
hence Parker did not apply to status of community property. R. 126. However, on
-7-

States

a2015

impression case, Comptroller of Treasury of Maryland v. Wynne, _U.S._, 135
S.Ct. 1787, 191 L.Ed.2d 813 (2015) abrogated Parker and applied the Dormant
Commerce Clause to state cross-border income tax cases. Wynne was decided in
2015. Parker v. Idaho State Tax Commission, 148 Idaho 842, 848, 230 P.3d 734
(Idaho 2010) was decided before the first impression case of Wynne, 135 S.Ct.
1737. Parker, 148 Idaho at 848, is obsolete since the 2015 case of Wynne. Wynne,
135 S.Ct. at 1801-1804, applies an internal consistency test that requires a court
to look to "the tax structure of the tax at issue to see whether its identical
application by every State in the Union would place interstate commerce at a
disadvantage as compared with commerce intrastate." Id. at 1802. (Internal
quotes disregarded) "Last Term, in Comptroller of the Treasury of Maryland v.

Wynne, the Court for the first time held that a state's tax on personal income was
subject to the restrictions of the dormant commerce clause." Dormant Commerce

Clause, Personal Income Taxation-Comptroller of the Treasury of Maryland v.
Wynne. 129 Harv.L.Rev. 181, November 2015. The Supreme Court 2014 Term
(leading case Constitutional Law Article 1, Harvard Law Review Association). The
Supreme Court in Comptroller of the Treasury of Maryland v. Wynne, 135 S.Ct. at
1796, discarded the distinction between gross receipts and net income,
-8-

raw

tax

not

its tax scheme from scrutiny under the Dormant Commerce Clause." Id. at 1799.
The issue has emerged from one of the most contentious issues that led to the
formation of the U.S. Constitution. "No principle is better settled than that the
power of a state, even its power of taxation, in respect to property is limited to
such as within its jurisdiction." New York, LE & WR Co. v. Com. of Pennsylvania,
153 U.S. 628, 14 S.Ct. 952, 38 L.E. 846 (1894) (quoted in Miller Bros. v. State of

Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 342, 74 S.Ct. 535, 98 L.Ed. 744 (1954) an excise tax
case).

Comptroller of the Treasury of Maryland v. Wynne,_ U.S._, 135 S.Ct.
1787, 191 L.Ed.2d 813 (2015), states:
[I]n order to succeed, the new Union would have to avoid the
tendencies toward economic Balkinization that had plagued relations
among the Colonies and later among the States under the Articles of
Confederation ... by prohibiting States from discriminating against
or imposing excessive burdens on interstate commerce without
congressional approval, it strikes at one of the chief evils that led to
the adoption of the Constitution, namely, state tariffs and other laws
that burdened interstate commerce. Id. at 1787.
The case of Blangers v. State, Dept. OfRevenue and Taxation, 114 Idaho 944,
763 P.2d 1052 (Idaho 1988) predated Wynne by some 28 years, but nonetheless
applies the commerce clause and also prohibited excessive burdens on interstate

-9-

stating

source

at 1

114 Idaho at 948, relied on Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 97
S.Ct. 1076, 51 L.Ed.2d 326 (1977), a case also relied on in Wynne, 135 S.Ct. at
1793, to determine fair apportionment and whether the tax "is fairly related to the
services provided by the State."

B.

Idaho Law recognizes source income.

Idaho Code § 63-3026A, in its relevant part, states "(1) for non resident
individuals trusts or estates the terms 'Idaho taxable income' includes only those
components of Idaho taxable income as computed for a resident which are derived
from or related to sources within Idaho." Barry Dunn's wages in Texas were not
derived from or related to sources within Idaho. "This "source based" income (i.e.
the income earned at its location) is the core issue."
The states power to tax on the bases of source is no less well
recognized than their power to tax on the bases of residence.
However, because the power to tax based on source derives only from
the protection that the states provide to 'persons property and
business transactions within their borders it is necessarily more
circumscribed than the power to tax that flows from 'domicil' itself.
Conseguently, when states seek to tax non resident individuals and
corporations using source as their sole jurisdictional bases, their
power extends only to the non residents property owned within the
State and their business, trade or profession carried on therein and
the tax is only on such income as derived from those sources.
(Underlining added)
Walter Hellerstein, Deciphering the Supreme Courts Opinion in Wynne, July 2015,
-10-

1
http://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/ cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2004&context=fac_artchop

C.

Comparison of common facts and law of Treasury of Maryland
v. Wynne to Linda Dunn.

The Wynnes lived in Maryland and owned a subchapter S corporation that
earned income and paid state income taxes to other states. Wynne, 135 S.Ct. at
1 793. The Wynne opinion treated the subchapter S income as personal income.
See, W. Hellerstein, Deciphering the Supreme Courts opinion in Wynne, July 2015,
J. Of Taxation, p. 5. Maryland allowed a credit for state, but not county taxes,
paid in other states. 135 S.Ct. 1793, 1803. The only issue was failure to allow
a credit for county taxes. Linda Dunn was taxed by Idaho on income earned by
her non-resident husband, earned in Texas. Texas has no state income tax. As
a first impression issue Wynne held that for Dormant Commerce Clause purposes
the difference between gross receipts and net income is eliminated. Wynne, 135
S.Ct. at 1792, 1796. At issue in both Wynne and Dunn are state income tax on
income earned outside the state, i.e. geographical source income. Source income
is income earned at the location that is other than the state of the taxpayers
domicile. Hellerstein, J ofTax'n, July 2015, at 7 f.14. Wynne did not establish a
strict source based rule. However, Wynne considered the source to establish the

-11-

see
by every State in the Union would place interstate commerce at a disadvantage as
compared with commerce intrastate." Wynne at 1802. The seven states that have
no income tax on wages, including Texas, Alaska and Washington, are at a
disadvantage as income earned by persons domiciled in these states pay no state
tax. Linda Dunn's non-resident husband earns income geographically in these
exempt states, the Idaho income tax inherently discriminates. The total tax
burden is what matters. Wynn, 125 S.Ct. at 1805. The tax on Linda Dunn is
discriminatory and unconstitutional in violation of the Dormant Commerce
Clause. The distinction of the Trial Court, R. 124-5, is wrong as the couple is
burdened with a tax in Idaho on income earned in non income tax states. The
total burden is compared. Parker, 148 Idaho 842, 230 P.3d 734 (2010) is not
binding on this issue as Wynne, the decision by the highest court construing
constitutional law, holds that the internal consistency test is violated. Walter
Hellerstein's book, J. Hellerstein & W. Hellerstein, State Taxation, (3d ed. 2003) is
referenced in Wynne, 135 S.Ct. 1801, he also co authored an amicus brief in

Wynne, July, 2015, J. ofTax'n at 6.
Idaho taxes income to Linda Dunn that would be exempt if she lived in
Texas. This is inherently discriminatory and acts as a tariff. It is voided by the
-12-

at I
importance to Linda Dunn. Tax free is enormously different from writing a check
for additional Idaho income tax. Some versus none is discriminatory.

D.

The Idaho Credit statute fails to address the states that have no
income tax.

Idaho Code § 32-906 defines Idaho community property and separate
property. The code section presumes that all property is community unless the
spouses, by written agreement, specify that the property is separate property.
"Specifically designated separate property'' is the "separate property to the spouse
to whom the property belongs. . . . Such property shall be subject to the
management of the spouse owning the property and shall not be liable for the
debts of the other member of the community." Idaho Code § 63-3029 credits
income taxes paid to another state "imposed on the individual." Apparently, it
applies dollar for dollar. It does not apply here as Texas has no income tax. This
is the source income that prevents the tax sought in this case.

The Tax

Commission assumes that Barry Dunn's wages are somehow "beamed" into Idaho.
It imposes what amounts to a tariff on Linda Dunn.

There is no internal

consistency as Idaho seeks an income tax on Linda's presumed community half
that would not be taxed in Texas.

-13-

E.

Alternatively, if Wynne is disregarded, the law of Texas applies
and the Income is still not taxed in Idaho

The two states both have community property ownership laws. The rule is
that when the spouses are domiciled in different states, the choice of law where
"movables" are the issue depends on where the "most significant relationship to
the spouse and to the earnings." Lane-Burslem v. C.I.R., 659 F.2d 209 (D.C. Cir.
1981) is very similar to the Dunn's situation. In Lane-Burslem, the wife and
husband resided in England but intended to retire in Louisiana, where the wife
was born. Id. at 211-12. Wife contended, for federal tax purposes, that one half
of her wages earned in England was community property and exempt from tax as
her husband was a non-resident alien.
exclusion.

The law, prior to 1926, allowed the

The court held that "the ownership interests in marital personal

property should be determined by the internal law of the state with the most
significant relationship and to the earnings." Id. at 214. England, where the
wages were earned, had the most significant relationship to the spouses "Under
English law, appellant would hold her income as separate, not community,
property." Id. at 215. In Seizer v. Sessions, 132 Wash.2d 642, 940 P.2d 261
(Wash. 1997), the husband lived in Washington where he bought a ticket and won
the lottery. His wife lived in Texas. Washington law applied. The court applied
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§

law

" ... because Rosalie and Elmer had separate domiciles when Elmer acquired the
lottery winnings, and Elmer was domiciled in Washington at that time. Id. at 651
In in re Marriage of Whelchel, 4 76 N. W .2d 104 (C.A. Iowa 1991) a divorce case, the
cash management account was acquired when the parties were married and living
in Texas and later moved to Iowa. Id. at 105-6. The court applied Restatement
(Second) Conflict of Law § 258 ( 1) and § 6(2) and held that where the two state
laws differed, Texas law applied as it had the "most significant relationship." Id.
at 110. It follows here that Texas law applies to Barry Dunn's wages earned and
paid in Texas. Texas has a unique marital property concept depending on who
has management rights to the property.

Management rights fall into two

categories, sole management rights and joint management rights. A spouse has
sole management rights over community property that would have been his or her
separate property had he or she acquired it while single. TEX.FAM.CODE ANN§
3.102(a). (Copy attached).

Wages earned by a spouse is sole management

property and not liable for non tortious liabilities of the other spouse. Vernon's
Texas Statutes and Codes Annotated Family Code§ 3.102(a)( 1) states that "During
marriage, each spouse has the sole management, control and disposition of the
community property that the spouse would have owned if single, including (1)
-15-

§ 3.202 also applies (copy attached); it states "(b) unless both spouse's are

personally liable as provided in this subchapter, the community property subject
to a spouse's sole management, control and disposition is not subject to: (2) any
non tortious liability that the other spouse incurs during marriage."

Wynne

applies and is reason for reversal. However, even if it does not apply Texas law
applies and also requires reversal.

The two theories to support reversal are

independent of the other.

F.

The Laws of Texas treat wages like separate property.

The question of what community property law applies is compounded as
Idaho community property does not have the exception that wages earned in
Texas are solely managed by the earner as if they were separate property.
Additionally the reason for the distinction is immunity to the non earner spouse's
creditors.

The statute, TEX.FAM.CODE ANN. (West 2012) § 3.102 states (a)

during marriage, each spouse has the sole management, control and disposition
of the community property that the spouse would have earned if single, including
(1) personal earnings. TEX.FAM.CODE ANN. (West 2012) § 3.202(b)(2) provides
that sole management of community income is not liable for the non earner's
spouse's non tortious liabilities. Barry Dunn is stipulated as not a resident or
-16-

Secondly, the earnings that are the sole issue in this case were sourced in Texas.
Linda Dunn submits that as a result, new cases like Corrigan v. Testa, _
N.E.3d_, 2016 WL 2341977 (S.C. Ohio, 2016) apply to her deceased husbands
Texas wages and grant her refund.

Corrigan, a non resident of Ohio, and

Connecticut resident, owner of an LLC, sold the business for a large amount. The
Court held that taxation in Ohio violated due process as it sought to tax value
earned outside borders of Ohio. The Court held that states could not tax nonresident income beyond its borders. It followed Wynne, 135 S.Ct. 1787, 1794, 191
L.Ed.2d 813 (2015). Id. at *3. The decision also quoted th,e "fundamental fairness"
of Quill Corp. v. North Dakota By and Through Heitkamp, 504 U.S. 298, 112 S.Ct.
1904, 119 L.Ed.2d. 91 (1992) Ibid. at *3.

The court granted the refund. Based

on the principle that, in addition to the State's connection with the person to be
taxed, there must be a connection to the activity itself. Id. at *6.
The Commerce Clause is not violated if the internal consistency test is met.
The answer is found in Edward H. Zalinsky, 7 Wm. & Mary Bus. L. Rev., 797
(2016) "The Enigma of Wynne."
New York City implements this approach under the city's municipal
income tax, which applies to residents but not to non residents.
Under the test of internal consistency, as explicated by Wynne, New
-17-

City need
residents a
taxes because New York City obtains internal consistency by not
taxing non residents on their income earned in the city. The New
York City tax is thus 'capital export neutral' and passes constitutional
muster under Wynne. Id. at 814.
Credits might cause the problem but the state did not indulge in this cure
as Maryland did not have a credit.

Maryland's tax "unconstitutionally

discriminates against interstate commerce." The tax here flunks the internal
inconsistency test. The reason is that Texas has no income tax. If interstate, the
tax is zero. Idaho is taxing Barry Dunn's wages earned in Texas where there is
no state income tax. Barry Dunn is a non resident of Idaho and the income is
earned outside Idaho. This is inconsistent because no reciprocal credit is needed.
The Idaho assessment violates the Dormant Commerce Clause as none of the
source activity took place in Idaho. All the tax on the income by Idaho violates the
Dormant Commerce Clause. If the couple lived in the place where the income is
earned, no state tax would be payable.
Texas Const. Art. 8, § 24 (copy attached) added by an amendment in 1993
will not allow the legislature to enact a state income tax unless it is approved by
a majority of voters voting in a statewide referendum. To date, no referendum
imposing the tax has been passed.

Hellerstein, Hellerstein and Swain, State Taxation, third ed. 2015, Thomson
-18-
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no. 2

4.16[1]

The Court reaffirmed the point it made in Tyler Pipe in Comptroller of the
Treasury v. Wynne. In Wynne, Maryland imposed a tax on a portion of its
residents' income earned in other states without providing a credit against the
residence-based tax for source-based taxes that Maryland residents paid on
such income to states in which the income was earned. The scheme
indisputably failed the internal consistency test, and the Court so held. If
every state imposed a regime like Maryland's, a taxpayer who confined her
activity to one state would pay a single tax on her income to the state where
she was a resident and in which she earned the income. By contrast, the
taxpayer who ventured across lines to earn her income would pay a double tax
on such income, one to her state of residence and another to the state in which
she earned the income. (Underlining added)
In the course of its opinion in Wynne, the Court reiterated the
proposition that provision of a credit for taxes paid to other states on the same
tax base will ordinarily render an otherwise internally inconsistent regime
internally consistent: "Maryland could remedy the infirmity in its tax scheme
by offering, as most States do, a credit against income taxes paid to other
States. See Tyler Pipe .. . . If it did, Maryland's tax scheme would survive the
internal consistency test and would not be inherently discriminatory. The
Court went on to illustrate the point, based on a hypothetical that assumed
that all states (like Maryland) imposed a 1.25 percent tax on (1) income that
residents earned in the state; (2) income that residents earned in other states;
and (3) income that nonresidents earned in the state, but also provided a credit
for taxes that residents paid to other states. "In that circumstance, April (who
lives and works in State A) and Bob (who lives in State A but works in State B)
would pay the same tax. Specifically, April would pay a 1.25% tax only once (to
State A), and Bob would pay a 1.25% tax only once (to State B, because State A
would give him a credit against the tax he paid to State B.)
In Wal-Mart Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Zaragoza-Gomez, 834 F.3d. 110 (1st Cir. 2016)
the Puerto Rico legislature enacted an alternative minimum tax on services
provided by a related party or home office outside of Puerto Rico. Id. at 43. The
-19-

was

unconstitutional on

Commerce Clause. The case quotes Wynne (Id. at 126) stating "The dormant
Commerce Clause is an implied limitation from the Commerce Clause that
'precludes States from discriminat[ing] between transactions on the basis of some
interstate element."'

G.

Federal tax law does not apply.

Federal tax law taxes all property earned in any state. State, not federal law
determines the extent of the interest in property. The Court below erred in
concluding that Kimsey v. Kimsey, 965 S.W.2d 690 (Ct. App. Tex. 1998) supports
the conclusion that Barry Dunn's wages were taxable to Linda Dunn for Idaho
Income tax purposes. The compelling reason is that in Kimsey both litigants were
Texas residents in a divorce case. In a divorce case all property is before the
court.

The court construed federal tax law 26 U.S.C. § 66 and 26 U.S.C.

6013(d)(3). The federal statutes require that married spouses specifically include
one half of the community property income in the other's federal tax return.
Section 6013 provides that the tax liability of a husband and wife who file a joint
tax return shall be joint and several. Kimsey was decided in 1992 Texas law, id.
at 693. Family Code§§ 3.201 and 3.202 were added in 1997 and 2009, after the
law applied to Kimsey was decided. Federal tax liability is joint and several.
-20-

V.

44

1

the issue only Federal exemption law applies. Wages are not exempt from federal
tax collection on a joint return no matter where earned or who earns them. 26
U.S.C. § 6334. The federal law can ignore the exempt status of property under
state law. U.S. v. Mitchell, 403 U.S. 190, 204, 91 S.Ct. 1763, 29 L.Ed.2d. 406
(1971). However, the federal income tax case of Crespi v. C.I.R. 44 B.T.A. 670
(1941) recognizes domicile. Crespi was born and raised in Texas and was only
temporarily in North Carolina. Crespi held" A domicile once acquired is presumed
to continue until it is shown to have changed." Id. at 671. The special rules of 26
U.S.C. 66(a)(l) and 26 U.S.C. § 879(a)(l) also allow couples to disregard
community property laws.
Douglas v. Delp, 987 S.W.2d 879 (S.C. Tex. 1999) holds that earnmg

capacity during marriage is sole management community property. Perez v. Perez,
587 S.W.2d 671 (S.C. Texas 1979) is conclusive. Roberto Perez was on active duty
during the marriage. A readjustment payment was payable for Roberto's active
service, some of which occurred during the marriage. Marian, Roberto's exwife,
petitioned for part of the payment as her community interest. The Court held that
loss of earnings during marriage was not a community asset. Id. at 673. White

v. White, 710 So.2d 208 (D.C. Fla. 1998) reviews Texas law and concludes that
-21-

sum

on

was not community property under Texas law. Id. at 211.

Montemayorv. Ortiz, 208 S.W. 3d 627 (Ct. App. Tex. 2006) also applies. The
case held that a judgment against a husband could not be collected against the
wife's special community property. The statute involved in Montemayor is the
same statute that applies to Barry Dunn's salary. Section 3.102 of the Family
Code provides that "during marriage, a spouse has the sole management, control
and disposition of the community property that the spouse would have owned if
single, including (1) personal earnings." Id. at 644. Citing the statute, the Court
held "Because Schor's remained under the sole management and control of Ortiz,
including any profits therefrom (whether or not some other portions of those
profits were then contributed to the community), we conclude that the trial court
properly determined that Schor's was the special community property of Ortiz, not
subject to any nontortious liabilities of Celada, not a joint debt, and not subject
to liability for the 1990 judgment debt. TEX.FAM.CODE ANN. (West 2012) §§
3.102 and 3.202 (Vernon 1998)." Id. at 645.

The Court held that the retail

business of the wife, named Schor's, started after marriage to her husband
Celada, who farmed in Mexico, was the special community property of wife and
not subject to the "non-tortious liabilities of Celada." Ibid. at 645. The trial court
-22-

on

v. Meador,

s

1

and Maben

v. Maben, 574 S.W.2d. 229, 232 (Tex.Civ.App. 1978) R. 117, to determine
community property ownership.

These cases are prior to the enactment of

U.T.G.A. Family Code, first enacted in 194 7 and amended in 2009. The 1997 and
Texas law S.B. No. 334, 1997 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. Ch 7 (S.B. 334) made
substantial revisions in marital law including Subchapter C titled Marital Property
Liabilities that included TEX.FAM.CODE ANN. (West 2012) § 3.202 that at
3.202(a)(l) and (2) that exempts "any liabilities that the other spouse incurred
before marriage or (2) any non tortious liabilities that the other spouse incurs
before marriage. The revisions led to cases like Douglas v. Delp, 987 S.W.2d 879,
(S.C. Tex. 1999) a Texas supreme court decision that states "when different kinds
of damages are claimed in a single cause of action, we look to the nature of each
injury when classifying those damages as community or separate property." Id. at
883. "Billy's loss of earning capacity during the marriage constitutes his solemanagement community property ... Therefore, the right to recover for any injury
to Billy's earning capacity and credit reputation ... would have belonged solely to
him were he not married." See TEX.FAM.CODE ANN

§§ 3.102, 3.102(a);

Cockerham v. Cockerham, 527 S.W.2d. at 169-70. Therefore the right to recover
for any injury to Billy's earning capacity and credit reputation was also swept into
-23-

well."

Ibid. at 883.

The classification of wages as separate management

community property is theoretical depending on tort or non tort liability.

It

depends on the nature of liability. There is no doubt here as state taxes are non
tort. It is analogous to Einstein's Theory of Relativity, i.e. everything is moving
relative to everything else. There is no fixed frame of reference. Here, if the
liability is non tort, the property is treated the same as separate. It is all relative
to the frame of reference. Wages are never tortious and they are never considered
income to a non resident, non earner spouse. The semantic origin is not important
here as there is nothing in the record to indicate a joint account or that the wages
ever crossed the several borders into Idaho. It is clear that Texas law applies.
Linda Dunn posted the necessary security. If the Idaho Tax Commission assigned
the collection to garnish Barry Dunn's wages in a Texas court, the full faith and
credit clause, of the U.S. Const. art IV§ 1, would deny recovery. Comity does not
apply to tax collection and tortious acts in a sister state. See, Franchise Tax Bd.

of California v. Hyatt, 538 U.S. 488,499, 123 S.Ct. .1683, 155 L.Ed.2d. 702 (2003).
Unlike Franchise Board, Ibid. 499. There is a "rudder" to determine that the
conflict of law favors Texas in this case. The case of In re Trammell, 399 B.R. 177
(Bkcy. D.C. Texas 2007) also applies. The husband had title of a Honda car. The
-24-

car

was

the

name.

court held

that the husband would have owned the vehicle ifhe was single since it was in his
name alone. The court held "In this instance, Trammell would have owned the
vehicle if single, since it is undisputed that it is titled solely in his name.
Cf.Tex.Fam.Code. Ann. § 3.104(a) (Vernon 2006). (during marriage, 'property is
presumed to be subject to the sole management, control, and disposition of a
spouse if it is held in that spouse's name, as shown by muniment, contract,
deposit of funds, or other evidence of ownership.' Accordingly, it appears that the
vehicle is Trammell's sole management community property." Id. at 184. The
vehicle was not an asset in the wife's Chapter 13 proceeding.
In Beal Bank v. Gilbert, 417 S.W.3d 704, (C.A. Texas 2013) the husband
owed the bank on a promissory note. The bank attempted to collect against the
wife's inheritance from her parents, but was unable to do so. "The judgment was
against Warren only and was based on a non-tortious liability. Beal Bank did not
have a right to payment from Pattie's separate property or sole management
community property. See TEX.FAM.CODE ANN§ 3.202(a)(b)(2)." Id. at 710.
Barry Dunn's wages are defined as sole management community property.
The wages are not taxable in Idaho or subject to Linda Dunn's debts. See in re
Hall, 559 B.R. 463 (Bkcy. Texas 2016). "Hall's separate property and community
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management

not available to

creditors of Hall's non-filing spouse." Id. at 468. Patel v. Kuciemba, 82 S.W.3d
589 (C.A. Texas 2002) applies. It states "Special community property is that
portion of the community that is under one spouse's exclusive control and is not
liable for the other spouse's debts."

Id. at 596.

The business was special

community property and the non operating spouse was not liable. Id. at 600. The
Trial Court, R. 119, also cited the federal tax case of Stokby v. C.I.R., 26 T.C. 912
(1956). The federal tax law applies to all income wherever derived by U.S. citizens.
Under federal law, liability for a joint return is joint and several even though one
spouse has no gross income. 26 U.S.C. § 6013(a) and (d)(3). In this case, the
consideration whether the Texas income is attributable to the non earner spouse
who is living in Idaho for Idaho income tax purposes. Therefore, includeable
income, not collection, is the issue.

H.

The Privileges and Immunities Clause of the U.S. Constitution
also applies.

Lunding v. New York Tax Appeals Tribunal, 522 U.S. 287, 118 S.Ct. 766, 139
L.Ed.2d 717 (1998) involves the same tax as here involved, state income tax. It
denied unequal income tax treatment to a non resident as a violation of the
privileges and immunities clause of the U.S. Constitution, Art. IV, § 2, entitling
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to
Citizens of the several States." This is based on comity between states. "Further,
the manner in which New York truces nonresidents, based on an allocation of an
'as if resident true liability, not only imposes upon nonresidents' income the effect
of New York's graduated true rates." Id. at 314. It is against public policy to apply
another state's laws. Comptroller of Treasury of Maryland v. Wynne, 135 S.Ct. at
1800 mentions the privileges and immunities clause.

Since the distinction

between gross receipts and net income is removed by Wynne, the distinction
between income and income true deductions is also logical and follows Wynne.

Franchise Tax Board of California v. Hyatt, 538 U.S. 488, 123 S.Ct. 1683, 155
L.Ed.2d 702 (2003) applied the full faith and credit clause. U.S. Const. Art. IV,
§ 1, and held that a Nevada Court was not required to apply California law. The

Court would not apply the state of Nevada's true collection laws to a Nevada
resident. The Court would not balance state true laws. Id. at 499.

Hansen v. Scott, 687 N.W.2d 247 (S.C.N.D. 2004) applied Texas law to Texas
residents. The place where payment is made is the place where the income was
received. See, e.g., Insteel Industries, Inc. v. Costanza Contracting Co., Inc., 276
F.Supp.2d 479, 487 (D.C. Virginia 2003). "To select, as the WPRA suggests, the
law of a state to which the individual or personality is a stranger, constitutes no
-27-

an act

throwing darts at a

on

" Experience

Hendrix, L.L.C. v. HendrixLicensing.com, LTD, 766 F. Supp.2d 1122, 1138

(D.C.W.D. Wash. 2011) (holding laws negating domicile unconstitutional).
CONCLUSION
Wynne applies the law of internal consistency to prohibit income from wages

paid to non residents outside the trucing state.
The alternative argument also applies. Texas law treats non resident wage
income like separate property. Linda Dunn, the non wage earner, is not entitled
to any of Barty Dunn's wage income. The case should be reversed and refund
granted.
Dated December 31, 2016.
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APPENDIX

Texas State Constitution, Art. 8, § 24 .............................. A-1
Vernon's Texas Statutes and Codes Annotated Family Code§ 3.102 ....... A-2
Vernon's Texas Statutes and Codes Annotated Family Code§ 3.104 ...... A-3
Vernon's Texas Statutes and Codes Annotated Family Code§ 3.202 ....... A-4

§ 24~ Persona! income tax; dedication of procetias, TX CONST Art 8 1 § 24

Vernon's Texas Statutes and Codes Annotated
Constitution of the State of Texas 1876 (Refs & Annos)
Article VIII. Taxation and Revenue
Vernon's Ann.Texas Const. Art. 8, § 24
§ 24. Personal income tax; dedication of proceeds

Currentness
Sec. 24. (a) A general law enacted by the legislature that imposes a tax on the net incomes of natural persons, including a
person's share of partnership and unincorporated association income, must provide that the portion of the law imposing
the tax not take effect until approved by a majority of the registered voters voting in a statewide referendum held on
the question of imposing the tax. The referendum must specify the rate of the tax that will apply to taxable income as
defined by iaw.

(b) A general law enacted by the legislature that increases the rate of the tax, or changes the tax, in a manner that results
in an increase in the combined income tax liability of all persons subject to the tax may not take effect until approved
by a majority of the registered voters voting in a statewide referendum held on the question of increasing the income
tax. A detennination of whether a bill proposing a change in the tax would increase the combined income tax liability
of all persons subject to the tax must be made by comparing the provisions of the proposed change in law with the
provisions of the law for the most recent year in which actual tax collections have been made. A referendum held under
this subsection must specify the manner in which the proposed law would increase the combined income tax liability of
all persons subject to the tax.

(c) Except as provided by Subsection (b) of this section, the legislature may amend or repeal a tax approved by the voters
under this section without submitting the amendment or the repeal to the voters as provided by Subsection (a) of this
section.

(d) If the legislature repeals a tax approved by the voters under this section, the legislature may reenact the tax without
submitting the reenactment to the voters as provided by Subsection (a) of this section only if the effective date of the
reenactment of the tax is before the first anniversary of the effective date of the repeal.

(e) The legislature may provide for the taxation of income in a manner which is consistent with federal law.

(f) In the first year in which a tax described by Subsection (a) is imposed and during the first year of any increase in the
tax that is subject to Subsection (b) of this section, not less than two-thirds of all net revenues remaining after payment
of all refunds allowed by law and expenses of collection from the tax shall be used to reduce the rate of ad valorem
maintenance and operation taxes levied for the support of primary and secondary public education. In subsequent years,
not less than two-thirds of all net revenues from the tax shall be used to continue such ad valorem tax relief.

(g) The net revenues remaining after the dedication of money from the tax under Subsection (f) of this section shall be
used for support of education, subject to legislative appropriation, allocation, and direction.

A - 1
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§ 24~ Persona! income tax; dedication of

The maximum rate at which a school district may impose ad valorem maintenance and operation taxes is reduced
an amount equal to one cent per $100 valuation for each one cent per $100 valuation that the school district's ad
valorem maintenance and operation tax is reduced by the minimum amount of money dedicated under Subsection (t)
of this section, provided that a school district may subsequently increase the maximum ad valorem maintenance and
operation tax rate if the increased maximum rate is approved by a majority of the voters of the school district voting at
an election called and held for that purpose. The legislature by general law shall provide for the tax relief that is required
by Subsection (f) and this subsection.

(i) Subsections (f) and (h) of this section apply to ad valorem maintenance and operation taxes levied by a school district
on or after the first January I after the date on which a tax on the net incomes of natural persons, including a person's
share of partnership and unincorporated association income, begins to apply to that income, except that if the income
tax begins to apply on a January I, Subsections (f) and (h) of this section apply to ad valorem maintenance and operation
taxes levied on or after that date.

(j) A provision of this section prevails over a conflicting provision of Article VII, Section 3, of this Constitution to the
extent of the conflict.

Credits
Adopted Nov. 2, 1993.

Notes of Decisions (I)
Vernon's Ann. Texas Const. Art. 8, § 24, TX CONST Art. 8, § 24
Current through the end of the 2015 Regular Session of the 84th Legislature
2016 Tlwmrnn R\'Ulcro. Nu claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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§ 3.102. Managing Community Property, TX FftJVULY § :t102

Vernon's Texas Statutes and Codes Annotated
Family Code (Refs & Annos)
Title 1. The Marriage Relationship (Refs & Annos)
Subtitle B. Property Rights and Liabilities
Chapter 3. Marital Property Rights and Liabilities (Refs & Annos)
Subchapter B. Management, Control, and Disposition of Marital Property
V.T.C.A., Family Code § 3.102
§ 3.102. Managing Community Property

Currentness
(a) During marriage, each spouse has the sole management, control, and disposition of the community property that the
spouse would have owned if single, including:

(1) personal earnings;

(2) revenue from separate property;

(3) recoveries for personal injuries; and

(4) the increase and mutations of, and the revenue from, all property subject to the spouse's sole management, control,
and disposition.

(b) If community property subject to the sole management, control, and disposition of one spouse is mixed or combined
with community property subject to the sole management, control, and disposition of the other spouse, then the mixed
or combined community property is subject to the joint management, control, and disposition of the spouses, unless the
spouses provide otherwise by power of attorney in writing or other agreement.

(c) Except as provided by Subsection (a), community property is subject to the joint management, control, and disposition
of the spouses unless the spouses provide otherwise by power of attorney in writing or other agreement.

Credits
Added by Acts 1997, 75th Leg., ch. 7, § 1, eff. April 17, 1997.

Notes of Decisions (327)
V. T. C. A., Family Code§ 3.102, TX FAMILY§ 3.102
Current through the end of the 2015 Regular Session of the 84th Legislature
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Vernon's Texas Statutes and Codes Annotated
Family Code (Refs & Annos)
Title 1. The Marriage Relationship (Refs & Annos)
Subtitle B. Property Rights and Liabilities
Chapter 3. Marital Property Rights and Liabilities (Refs & Annos)
Subchapter B. Management, Control, and Disposition of Marital Property
V.T.C.A., Family Code § 3.104
§ 3.104. Protection of Third Persons

Currentness
(a) During marriage, property is presumed to be subject to the sole management, control, and disposition of a spouse if
it is held in that spouse's name, as shown by muniment, contract, deposit of funds, or other evidence of ownership, or if
it is in that spouse's possession and is not subject to such evidence of ownership.

(b) A third person dealing with a spouse is entitled to rely, as against the other spouse or anyone claiming from that
spouse, on that spouse's authority to deal with the property if:

(1) the property is presumed to be subject to the sole management, control, and disposition of the spouse; and

(2) the person dealing with the spouse:

(A) is not a party to a fraud on the other spouse or another person; and

(B) does not have actual or constructive notice of the spouse's lack of authority.

Credits
Added by Acts 1997, 75th Leg., ch. 7, § I, eff. April 17, 1997.

Notes of Decisions (20)
V. T. C. A., Family Code§ 3.104, TX FAMILY§ 3.104
Current through the end of the 2015 Regular Session of the 84th Legislature
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§ 3.202~ Rules of r,1aritai Property

Vernon's Texas Statutes and Codes Annotated
Family Code (Refs & Annos)
Title 1. The Marriage Relationship (Refs & Annos)
Subtitle B. Property Rights and Liabilities
Chapter 3. Marital Property Rights and Liabilities (Refs & Annos)
Subchapter C. Marital Property Liabilities
V.T.C.A., Family Code§ 3.202
§ 3.202. Rules of Marital Property Liability
Effective: September 1, 2009
Currentness
(a) A spouse's separate property is not subject to liabilities of the other spouse unless both spouses are liable by other
rules of law.

(b) Unless both spouses are personally liable as provided by this subchapter, the community property subject to a spouse's
sole management, control, and disposition is not subject to:

(I) any liabilities that the other spouse incurred before marriage; or

(2) any nontortious liabilities that the other spouse incurs during marriage.

(c) The community property subject to a spouse's sole or joint management, control, and disposition is subject to the
liabilities incurred by the spouse before or during marriage.

(d) All community property is subject to tortious liability of either spouse incurred during marriage.

(e) For purposes of this section, all retirement allowances, annuities, accumulated contributions, optional benefits,
and money in the various public retirement system accounts of this state that are community property subject to the
participating spouse's sole management, control, and disposition are not subject to any claim for payment of a criminal
restitution judgment entered against the nonparticipant spouse except to the extent of the nonparticipant spouse's interest
as determined in a qualified domestic relations order under Chapter 804, Government Code.

Credits
Added by Acts 1997, 75th Leg., ch. 7, § 1, eff. April 17, 1997. Amended by Acts 2009, 81st Leg., ch. 1244, § 1, eff. Sept.
I, 2009.

Notes of Decisions (452)
V. T. C. A., Family Code§ 3.202, TX FAMILY§ 3.202
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